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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Failures within a system can cause disruptions to op-
erational functionality.  The ability to diagnose a 
fault when it occurs is the first step to minimising 
this failure disruption time.  Several techniques have 
focused on identifying faults at a specific point in 
time using a series of testing procedures [Novak et 
al. 2000, Pattipati & Alexandridis, 1990].  The 
methods work using information regarding symp-
toms exhibited by the system when a fault is present.  
Tests are carried out on the system to ‘hone in’ on 
the fault cause(s).  These approaches have been 
found to be effective in identifying single faults al-
though have more difficulty coping with the com-
plexities of multiple fault combinations (especially 
with dependency issues).  In addition, these methods 
are suitable for systems which have a period of inac-
tivity where testing can occur at appropriate times 
without disruption.  This allows identification of any 
faults prior to operation.  However, this type of pro-
cedure is not effective if failure occurs between the 
specified points of diagnosis as the maximum recov-
ery time of the system is not utilised without imme-
diate detection.  Thus, the characteristics associated 
with modern day systems require real time diagnosis 
and to incorporate both adaptability and identifica-
tion of multiple faults (Venkatasubramanian et al. 
2003). Systems usually operate in more than one 
mode, for example, an aircraft fuel system can be 
used in flight and during refuel, and so an ideal 
situation involves being able to adapt the scope of 
the diagnostics procedure.  
 In trying to deal with diagnosis of multiple faults 
extensions to the testing procedures have been de-
veloped (Shakeri et al. 2000), in addition such tools 
as genetic algorithms (Yangping, 2000) have been 
implemented, both with limited success.  Other re-
cent approaches have used reliability assessment 
tools such as failure modes and effects analysis 
(Price 1997, Price & Taylor 1997), fault tree analysis 
(Hurdle et al. 2005) and a combination of both 
(Henning & Paasch 2000).  Variability in perform-
ance of these methods is exhibited with increased 
system complexity. The method of digraphs has been 
used for limited multiple failures (Iverson & Patter-
sine-Hine 1995) identifying the potential for real-
time automated monitoring and diagnosis, with im-
provement needed in the number of faults revealed. 
 With a limitation on the number of effective real 
time multiple fault diagnostic tools currently in the 
literature, this paper compares the most recent fault 
tree analysis and digraph based methods.  The re-
view focuses on the application to an aircraft fuel rig 
system.  Section 2 reviews the application fuel sys-
tem in detail.  Section 3 explains each of the indi-
vidual diagnostic methods. Section 4 considers the 
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results obtained from the diagnostic methods when 
applied to the fuel rig.  A discussion is provided in 
Section 5 and Section 6 gives conclusions to the re-
search. 
2 FUEL SYSTEM 
2.1 System Architecture 
The purpose of a fuel system is to reliably provide an 
adequate amount of clean fuel at the right pressure to 
the engines during all phases of flight.  A schematic 
of the experimental fuel rig utilised in this research 
is presented in Figure 1.  It is representative of a 
modern aircraft fuel system, the only difference be-
ing that water is used as the fluid representative of 
the fuel. 
 
Figure 1. Fuel Rig Schematic 
 
Three tanks (Main, Wing and Collector) form the 
fuel system which feeds the engine.  Each tank has 
two associated pump trays encompassing a peristal-
tic pump, a pressure relief valve, powered and man-
ual isolation valves and a pressure regulating valve.  
The collector tank provides the only feed of fuel 
to the engine tank which occurs via a parallel set up 
of two pumps.  The main storage of fuel for the col-
lector tank is via the main tank.  Two pumps, con-
nected in parallel, pump fuel from the main tank to 
the collector tank. The auxiliary storage tanks of the 
aircraft fuel system are represented by the wing tank. 
Like the main tank, two parallel pumps transfer fuel 
from the wing tank to the collector tank. A large sin-
gle tank at the base of the fuel rig represents an air-
craft engine.  A final pump, the centrifugal refuel 
pump, transfers fuel back into the active supply 
tanks from the engine tank (representative of refuel-
ing). Complete drainage of the fuel system is con-
ducted through utilising the engine tank drain valve.  
Each of the three active supply tanks are also con-
nected to the engine tank via a manually operated 
dump valve (to represent the dump situation of a real 
aircraft system).   
The two main modes of operation are ‘active’ and 
‘dormant’.  In the active mode fluid is transferred 
from the collector tank to the ‘engine’ (engine tank).  
As the collector tank level decreases the transfer of 
fuel from the wing and main tanks to the collector 
tank commences. The tank pumps are switched on 
and powered isolation valves opened.  In the dor-
mant mode the system is in standby, no transfer of 
fuel occurs between the active supply tanks and the 
engine. The tank pumps are switched off and pow-
ered isolation valves shut. 
Two further modes which can be considered are 
‘refuel’ and ‘fuel dumping’. Refuelling involves 
transferring fluid from the engine tank store to the 
three active supply tanks. During fuel dumping the 
system is drained of all fluid. 
2.2 Component Failure Modes 
There are 43 different component failure modes con-
sidered in the analysis, which may affect the func-
tionality of the fuel rig system. Each component fail-
ure mode is allocated a code which contains the 
relevant component identification number. The ma-
jority of the failure modes (30) are associated with 
one of six valve categories. The valve genres com-
prise pressure relief (PSV), powered isolation (IVP), 
pressure regulating (BP), block bleed (BBV), and 
drain (IV). All of the valve classes can fail blocked 
or leaking. Partial blockage failures could also affect 
all valves apart from those in the block bleed cate-
gory. In addition, pressure relief, powered isolation, 
block bleed and drain valves can fail either open or 
closed. A final failure, only connected to pressure re-
lief and powered isolation valves, involves failing 
stuck in an intermediate position.  
The peristaltic pumps, located in each tank feed 
line, have four related failure modes whilst the cen-
trifugal pumps, utilised in both the transfer and re-
fuel, have three. The pumps can fail on, shut off or 
leaking. A further failure mode only associated with 
the peristaltic pumps involves a mechanical failure. 
Each tank has two failure modes; tank ruptured or 
leaking. There are four possible pipe component 
failures. These relate to ruptures, leakages, and com-
plete or partial blockages of individual pipes.  
2.3 Monitoring System Operational Behaviour 
The fuel system status can be obtained using the in-
formation from three types of sensors associated 
within the tanks.  These are level, flow and pressure 
transmitters.  Distributed throughout the system are 
four level transmitters (one in each of the main, 
wing, collector and engine tanks), seven flow trans-
mitters (two for each of the wing, main and collector 
tanks, one for the engine tank), and six pressure 
transmitters (two for each of the main, wing and col-
lector tanks). For diagnostics the level transmitters 
allow categorization of the fuel level into high 
(above required level), low (below pump shut off 
level), required level (maximum refuelling level), 
fine section (between pump shut off and required re-
fuelling level), pump shut off (level at which insuffi-
cient fuel for transfer) or empty.  The pressure 
transmitter readings allow classification of high 
pressure levels, no pressure or partial pressure.  
Similarly the flow transmitters identify readings of 
flow, no flow or partial flow.  
2.4 Fuel System Assumptions 
In modelling the fuel system various assumptions 
have been made.  A blockage whether in a valve or a 
pipe assumes a complete blockage preventing any 
flow of fuel.  Pipe rupture infers that the fuel will 
flow out of the rupture site and not along its intended 
path.  A partial blockage (in a valve or pipe) refers to 
a partial stoppage of flow.  A leak (in a valve or 
pipe) will result in some fluid loss yielding partial 
flow.  For the analysis steady state operation of the 
system has been assumed as well as reliable sensor 
readings monitoring the system behaviour (with the 
issue of unreliable sensors discussed in section 5). 
3 DIAGNOSTIC METHOD OVERVIEW 
This paper considers the diagnostic application of 
the fault tree and digraph methods.  Each method 
follows a set of steps described in sections 3.1 and 
3.2. 
3.1 Fault Tree Diagnostic Method 
Fault Tree Analysis has been around as a reliability 
assessment technique since the 1970s.  It is con-
cerned with the analysis of failures and provides a 
diagrammatic description of the various causes of a 
specified system failure in terms of the failure of its 
components (Andrews & Moss, 2002).  Utilising the 
method for fault diagnostics involves the following 
steps: 
 
Step 1 - Construct fault trees for observable system 
deviations 
The behaviour of the system can be monitored by 
sensors located at specific points.  Fault trees are 
constructed to represent the failure modes at these 
locations.  Non-coherent fault trees are con-
structed which include failure and success states 
of the components. 
Step 2 – Determination of System Status 
Compare the readings indicative of the current 
system behaviour with those that are expected 
given the mode of operation.  Deviations are rep-
resentative of fault(s) present. 
Step 3 – Diagnostic Fault Tree Construction 
Construct a top event structure from the sensor 
deviations identified in step 2.  Combine all read-
ings using an AND gate if more than one. Perform 
analysis to obtain potential causes of failure.   
Step 4 – Consistency Verification 
Check the potential causes of system failure ob-
tained in step 3 against the sensors reading true to 
the operating mode.  Any potential causes of fail-
ure that could cause these true sensor readings to 
be false can be removed. 
Step 5 – Fault Cause Ranking 
In the instance of multiple fault cause options im-
portance rankings can be used to determine the 
most likely cause of failure. 
3.2 Digraph Diagnostic Method 
Digraphs (Andrews & Morgan 1986) can be used 
within engineering applications to represent the in-
terrelationships between the process variables.  
These variables include measures such as tempera-
ture, mass flow and pressure.  Nodes (or circles) in 
the diagram are used to represent the process vari-
ables and edges (lines) are used to represent the in-
terconnections, i.e. positive/negative influences.  
Nodes also represent component failure modes, 
whereby a signed edge connecting a failure mode 
node to a process variable node indicates the distur-
bance which the failure mode can cause.  A simple 
digraph is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A Simple Digraph Representation 
 
The process variables in Figure 2 are the mass flow 
at location 1 (M1) and the mass flow at location 2 
(M2).  The relationship between the two is reflected 
by the three edges. M1 is the independent variable 
whilst M2 is the dependent variable since a directed 
edge connects M2 to M1. The edge with a gain of +1 
is a normal edge since this represents the relation-
ship which is usually true. The second and third 
edges are conditional edges since their relationship is 
only true whenever the condition represented by ‘:’ 
exists. It must be noted that only one edge is true at 
any one time.  
Process variable deviations and disturbances 
(Kohda & Henley 1988, Andrews & Brennan 1990) 
within digraphs are expressed as one of five discrete 
values: +10, +1, 0, -1, -10, representing respectively; 
large high, small high, normal, small low and large 
low.  An unexpected process deviation within a sys-
tem is represented by ‘highlighting’ the respective 
node in the digraph. Subsequent propagation of the 
deviation through the system is represented by mark-
ing all of the nodes which were affected by the initial 
highlighting. 
 To utilize the method for diagnosis initially the 
digraph of the system must be constructed.  The 
steps for this process are: 
 
Step 1 - System Definition 
Define system to be analysed and list all compo-
nent failures. 
Step 2 – System Unit Classification 
Separate the system into sub-units and identify 
and classify control loops, if present. 
Step 3 – Diagraph Unit Model Development 
Generate digraph models for the sub-units taking 
into consideration all process variable deviations 
which could have an effect on the variables in the 
model. Also consider the extent of the effect the 
process variable deviations may have on the sys-
tem with regards to assigning discrete values to 
the deviations.  
Step 4 – System Diagraph Formation 
Form system digraph model by connecting com-
mon variables from the sub-unit models. 
 
Once constructed the system digraph model can be  
used for finding the fault cause(s) by: 
 
Step 5 - Identify Deviations 
 Compare actual and expected system behaviour. 
Step 6 - Flag Non-deviating 
Identify the non-deviating sensor nodes on the di-
graph. 
Step 7 - Back-trace 
 Perform diagnosis from noted transmitter devia-
tions to flagged non-deviated nodes or until no 
further back tracing can be carried out. 
4 APPLICATION OF DIAGNOSTIC METHODS 
4.1 Actual System Operating Behaviour 
In using both methods deviations are considered 
from the normal expected operating behaviour of the 
system.  In the active mode it is assumed that there 
would be flow out of the main and wing tanks into 
the collector tank, where fuel transfers to the engine.  
The expected sensor readings for the main tank 
would be that the level transmitter (LT0110) would 
indicate a level greater than the pump shut off re-
quirement indicating fuel available for transfer.  The 
flow transmitter (FT0100) which transfers fuel for 
draining would indicate no flow.  The flow transmit-
ter (FT0110) which monitors flow to the collector 
tank would register flow, and the pressure transmit-
ters (PT0110/0120) would each register pressure 
(sensor codes are shown in figure 3). 
The corresponding sensors on the wing tank 
would indicate the same respective readings.  The 
readings for the Collector tank would also indicate 
required level, no flow to drain, flow to engine and 
pressure at both pressure transmitters. 
The expected sensor readings can also be obtained 
for the other operational modes. 
To illustrate within the paper the diagnostic proc-
ess, the actual readings from all the sensors within 
the system have been assumed to indicate a devia-
tion within the main tank.   
 
The readings for this section are (with the deviated 
state in bold): 
LT0110:  >Pump Shut Off Level 
FT0100:  No Flow 
FT0110:  No Flow 
PT0110/0120: Pressure 
All other readings conform to expectation. 
 
 
Figure 3. Main Tank  
 
4.2 Using The Fault Tree Method 
To utilise this method a fault tree is constructed to 
represent the causes of unexpected system behav-
iour.  The inputs to this diagnostic tree depicting the 
actual system functionality are the fault trees for the 
necessary sensor failure modes (step 1).  Considering 
the main tank, there would be three fault trees for the 
failure modes of the flow transmitter monitoring 
flow from the main tank to drain (FT0100), repre-
senting the causes of No Flow, Flow and Partial 
Flow.  The same three fault tree failure modes would 
be constructed for the flow transmitter monitoring 
the state of flow from the main tank to the collector 
tank (FT0110).  Each pressure transmitter (PT0110 
and PT0120) would have three fault trees represent-
ing the failure modes High Pressure, No pressure, 
Partial pressure. 
 Each fault tree for the sensor failure modes varies 
in size, with the largest having 55 gates and 90 
events and the smallest fault tree having just 12 gates 
and 20 events.  All fault trees contain failure and 
success events, therefore use AND, OR and NOT 
logic (referred to as non-coherent fault trees).  The 
inclusion of the success events (or equivalent NOT 
logic) helps to remove failure causes that are not 
possible when more than one sensor failure mode are 
combined. 
Given the actual behaviour of the system, devia-
tions from the expected state is indicative of a fault 
or faults within the system.  To establish the faults 
the causes are extracted by combining the individual 
faults trees constructed in step 1, representing the 
deviated readings, using AND logic.   
From the assumed actual system behaviour (dis-
cussed in section 4.1) the deviated reading from the 
normal active behaviour involves the flow from the 
main tank to the collector tank (monitored by 
FT0110).  The actual reading is No Flow, therefore 
the top event structure for the deviated state will in-
volve just ‘No Flow at FT0110’.  
 No flow at FT0110 is caused by either a failure 
immediately before the sensor, namely in the section 
of pipe labelled P117, or a failure on both lines 1 and 
2 of the tank. When considering the failure at P117, 
it can fail blocked or ruptured.  As the fault trees 
also consider the working states then if the pipe is 
ruptured it can not be blocked, partially blocked or 
leaking.  If the pipe is ruptured it can not be blocked, 
partially blocked or leaking.  Hence the intermediate 
gate combination will involve two intermediate input 
combinations, one will be the AND’ed combination 
of P117 blocked, NOT P117 ruptured, NOT P117 
partially blocked and NOT P117 leaking.  The other 
will be P117 ruptured, NOT P117 blocked, NOT 
P117 partially blocked and NOT P117 leaking 
AND’ed together. 
A failure will occur on line 1 if there is a blockage 
or a rupture in P102, P104, P105, P106, P107, or 
P108.  If P102 is blocked then it can not be ruptured, 
partially blocked or leaking, similarly if it is ruptured 
it can not be blocked, partially blocked or leaking.  
The same analogy can be made for the other five 
pipes (P104-108). The isolation valve, IVP0110, 
could be blocked, or failed closed, and NOT failed 
open, stuck, partially blocked or leaking.  The back 
pressure valve, BP0110, could be blocked and NOT 
partially blocked or leaking, or the pump itself 
(PP0110) could have failed shut off and NOT failed 
mechanically, leaking or failed on. 
Similarly a failure will occur on line 2 if there is a 
blockage or a rupture in P109, P110, P112, P113, 
P114, P115 or P116. They can not be ruptured, leak-
ing or partially blocked if blocked.  If the pipes are 
ruptured then they can not be blocked, partially 
blocked or leaking.  The IVP0120 valve could be 
blocked or failed closed and NOT failed open, leak-
ing or stuck.  The back pressure valve BP0120 could 
be blocked and NOT partially blocked or leaking, or 
the pump (PP0120) could be shut off and NOT 
failed mechanically, leaking or failed on.  The tank 
also could be the problem area having ruptured. 
When analysing the fault tree using the standard 
qualitative procedures prime implicants are pro-
duced.  These are combinations which include fail-
ure and success events.  For example, one combina-
tion from ‘No flow at FT0110’ is: P102B.P109B.-
P102F.-P102PB.-P102L.-P109F.-P109PB.-P109L 
where the – symbol means NOT that failure event.  
As the purpose of the diagnosis is to yield the failure 
events, a coherent approximation needs to be carried 
out (basically removing the success states) to yield 
the combinations of failure causes.  Therefore the 
coherent approximation of the example prime impli-
cant would be P102B.P109B.  In total for this given 
system state there are a total of 292 failure causes for 
having No Flow at FT0110. 
Information can be gained by considering those 
sensors that are true to the operating mode, hence 
reducing any causes from the list which can not be 
possible as they are functioning to permit non-
deviating outcomes.  Performing this consistency 
check results in 83 fault combinations. Two are sin-
gle component failures, pipe 117 blocked (P117B) 
and pipe 117 ruptured (P117R).  The remaining 81 
combinations all involve the failure of two compo-
nents together. 
To try and establish the most likely cause of fail-
ure importance measures can be used.  The Fussel-
Vesely probabilistic measure of minimal cut set im-
portance has been used in this research.  Each poten-
tial failure cause combination (cut set) can be given 
a numerical rating, with the highest rating being 
deemed the most likely cause of failure.  This value 
is calculated by evaluating the probability of cut set 
failure divided by the diagnostic tree probability of 
failure.  For this example, the single order cut sets 
rank first and second, with the pipe rupture cause be-
ing ranked highest due to its higher probability of 
occurrence. 
4.3 Using The Digraph Method 
With the system defined and the component failure 
modes identified, the next step involves constructing 
the unit digraph models for the main, collector and 
wing tanks (step 3).  Due to the inclusion of partial 
failure modes in the analysis a further two discrete 
values +5 and -5, representing moderate high and 
moderate low, are used to describe process variable 
deviations and the gains associated with the edges 
connecting failure modes.  
 
Figure 4: Part of Main Tank Digraph 
 
The unit model digraph for the main tank is devel-
oped through a process of ‘building-up’ from the 
tank level node, L101. Two near identical branches 
extend from L101. These represent the flow of fluid 
from the tank through the peristaltic pumps, PP0110 
and PP0120. The upper branch on the full digraph 
model encompasses mass flow (denoted M in the di-
graph nodes) along pipe 102 through to pipe refer-
enced 108, representing the flow of fluid through the 
main tank line one of Figure 3.  The mass flow sec-
tion M106 to M108 is shown in figure 4.  The lower 
branch of the full model depicts flow through line 
two of the main tank, encompassing mass flow from 
locations 109 to 116 (the part section from pipe 114, 
M114, to pipe 116, M116, is shown in Figure 4). 
Towards the end of each main tank line there is a 
powered isolation valve (IVP0110, IVP0120) and 
back pressure valve (BP0110, BP0120). If the pow-
ered isolation valves are closed by the operator then 
this would invoke a nullification of the relationship 
between the mass flows either side of the valve.  
Nodes M108 and M116 (mass flow at location 108 
and 116) are connected though an ‘AND’ gate since 
a failure would have to occur in both main tank lines 
if no mass flow was to pass to the collector tank 
through pipes at locations 117 and 118. All of the 
mass flow nodes are positively dependant on the 
mass flow at the previous location and hence are 
connected by edges ‘signed’ +1. Mass flow also has 
a positive effect on the force powering the peristaltic 
pumps. 
The rest of the digraph model for the main tank is 
built up in the same way.  The unit model for this 
tank is constructed from 242 nodes, 43 process vari-
ables and 199 component failure modes (140 of 
these being pipe failures).  The same process is car-
ried out for the wing and collector tank models.  The 
three individual units are connected via common 
nodes to form the full system digraph model (step 4 
of the diagnostic process).  In total there are 842 
nodes; 151 are process variable nodes and 691 are 
component failure mode nodes. This completes the 
digraph construction steps. 
The diagnosis phase involves back-tracing 
through the system digraph from a specific node 
which represents the location of the given deviation, 
if more than one deviation is experienced then back 
tracing commences at all points.  
Given the actual system behaviour for the fuel 
system this deviates from the known operating mode 
of the system with flow at the flow transmitter 
FT0110.  Hence, the diagnostic results obtained from 
the digraph are explained in the following steps: 
 
1) Given the FT0110 flow deviation, back-tracing 
takes into consideration failure modes resulting in 
a large negative disturbance correlating with the 
situation of ‘no flow’ e.g. M117(-10). 
2) From the non-deviating transmitter readings, the 
following parts of the digraph can be flagged: up-
per and lower branches incorporating PT0110 and 
PT0120, as well as the sections related to the 
level transmitter LT0110 and flow transmitter 
FT0100.  
3) The direct component failure mode inputs into the 
node M117(-10) leads to the failure mode of pipe 
117 being blocked or ruptured (P117B or P117R). 
Further back-tracing from M117(-10) leads to 
M116(-10) AND M108(-10). 
4) Back-tracing past the ‘AND’ gate on the upper 
branch reveals failures leading to M108(-10). 
There are three failure modes which could lead to 
a large negative disturbance at node M108; pipe 
108 being blocked or ruptured (P108B/R) and the 
block bleed valve BP0110 failing blocked 
(BP110B). Further failure modes are determined 
through following the fault propagation to node 
M106(-10). Back-tracing ceases at node M106 
due to reaching the flagged section associated 
with PT0110. 
5) Back-tracing past the ‘AND’ gate on the lower 
branch reveals failures leading to M116(-10). 
There are three failure modes which could lead to 
a large negative disturbance at node M116; pipe 
116 being blocked or ruptured (P116B/R) and the 
block bleed valve BP0120 failing blocked 
(BP120B). Further failure modes are determined 
through following the fault propagation to node 
M114(-10). In a similar manner to the procedure 
described in (4), back-tracing ceases at node 
M114 due to reaching the flagged section associ-
ated with PT0120. 
 
The diagnostic results achieved through the process 
of back-tracing for the deviation in the actual read-
ings are shown in Table 1.  
 
Before ‘AND’ gate P117B/R 
OR 
Upper Branch 
P108B/R, BP110B, P107B/R, IVP110C, 
IVP110B, P106B/R 
AND 
Lower Branch 
P116B/R, BP120B, P115B/R, IVP120C, 
IVP120B, P114B/R 
Table 1. Faulty Scenario Diagnostic Results 
 
For the given scenario it is possible that either a 
single fault or multiple fault may have led to the reg-
istered deviation; the diagnostic results confirm this. 
In total there are 83 failure mode options; 2 single 
order and 81 second order.  Final human interven-
tion, with the ability to call on engineering knowl-
edge and experience will target the most probable 
failure modes. The list of failure modes can be fur-
ther reduced by changing the operating mode of the 
system and comparing the causes for any registered 
sensor deviations noted in the two phases. In the 
case of multiple deviating sensors, the diagnostic re-
sults for each sensor are AND-ed together to deter-
mine the possible failure cause(s).  
Through incorporating ‘flagging’ into the diagnos-
tics process potential inconsistent failure mode re-
sults and anomalies are removed. This acts as a form 
of consistency check and removes the possibility for 
conflicting results to exist between non-deviating 
sensor readings and failure modes ascertained 
through back-tracing from deviating nodes.  
5 DISCUSSION 
5.1 Overall Performance of the Methods 
The digraph and the fault tree approaches are noted 
as displaying a complementary perspective. Di-
graphs display the failure propagation route through 
a system whereas fault trees focus on a certain com-
bination of events which can lead to the top event 
(noted deviation).  
Both methods require diagnostic models (either a 
fault tree or a digraph) to be constructed prior to any 
analysis.  In addition the similarities extend to re-
quiring the difference to be calculated between ac-
tual system behaviour and that which is expected.  
With the large number of sensors throughout the 
whole system there is the potential for thousands of 
deviations from the expected behaviour.  It has not 
been possible to test both techniques on all possible 
system state alternatives, however consideration of 
single, two failures and a collection of more than 
two failures has yielded encouraging results.   
   The main discussions on the fault tree method are 
in section 5.2 and for the digraph in section 5.3. 
5.2 Fault Tree Review 
To utilise the fault tree method requires the system-
atic breakdown of the causes of each failure mode 
for each sensor.  The generation of each of these 
trees is the major task in using this method.  As the 
number of sensors increases the number of fault 
trees required similarly increases. Having generated 
these trees the method for diagnosis is very straight 
forward and easy to implement.  This issue of scal-
ability could be a factor with more sensors because 
as the number of deviations increase the number of 
inputs in the diagnostic tree increases.  Within the 
aircraft fuel system application this has not been a 
limiting factor.  
The results obtained from the analysis of the fuel 
system have yielded viable fault causes, although 
several options have been produced.  Importance 
measures have provided one means to be able to 
identify the most likely cause.  The current research 
has not considered faulty sensor readings although a 
method of using other system parameters such as 
flow rate and rate of change of height have been 
identified as a means to locate unreliable sensors. 
 Direct application of the method discussed in the 
paper to diagnose faults when the system is operat-
ing dynamically may not be straight forward, and the 
consideration of time factors may need to be incor-
porated. 
5.3  Digraph Review 
Digraphs provide a clear representation of the rela-
tionships between the system variables as it closely 
reflects the physical structure of the system.  To pro-
duce the model requires a thorough understanding of 
the system, however it can be developed from de-
tailed engineering drawings.  The full digraph for the 
application system is relatively large, however de-
velopment is aided by the sub-unit divisions.   
In terms of the diagnosis process the method of 
back tracing, using deviated and non-deviated vari-
ables, is very simple and can easily be automated 
within computer code.  Flagging of non deviating 
sections removes the possibility of revealing incon-
sistent failure modes or anomalies in the fault diag-
nostic results.  The inclusion of +/- 5 within the di-
graph has provided the ability to include partial fail-
ures into the analysis. 
The limitations and extensions of the method 
firstly relate to the dynamic effects, although pre-
liminary research investigations in this area have fo-
cussed on using change of height information, in 
conjunction with transmitter readings. 
A mechanism to identify the actual cause(s) of 
any deviations is required to reduce the current out-
put from the model.  Investigations focus on using 
knowledge of past failures (if present) and weighting 
failure modes.  Other issues to investigate are unreli-
able sensors and identification of these sensors, 
which is likely to include some form of time func-
tion.  The issue of extendability to more complex 
systems seems plausible as even with large models 
they can easily be handled with modern computer 
systems.  Also the technique is suited to handle con-
trol mechanisms and therefore provides flexibility to 
perform diagnosis on these types of system. 
6   CONCLUSIONS 
Both methods have produced realistic results for 
steady state behaviour.  With no difference in predic-
tive potential for this application system the digraph 
method seems the most efficient (as consistency 
checking is done within the approach). Further re-
search is required in terms of dynamic behaviour and 
importance of sensor location to aid diagnosis. 
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